Heidi Tagliavini hält Rede zu dem Bericht ihrer Kommission vor der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarates (PACE)

28.04.2010 | Civil.ge | Link zur Quelle | Bilder | Video |

Tagliavini's Report Heard at PACE Debates >>Extraseite EU-geförderter Bericht zum Augustkrieg
Georgia “triggered off the war” with heavy artillery attack on Tskhinvali in August, 2008, however, this attack was not an isolated event, but a culminating point of years of mounting tensions and all sides bear responsibility, Heidi Tagliavini, who led EU-funded fact-finding mission into causes of the war, said on April 28.
She recited key findings of the mission’s report, which was released last September, in an address to Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE). Her statement was followed by debates at the April 28 PACE session about the consequences of the August war.
In her speech before the Assembly, Tagliavini said that the report by Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) was made public immediately after the release in order “to avoid misquotations and misinterpretations.”
She said that reactions to the report in the press and in public had been mainly “positive, or factual and neutral”.
“The conflicting parties have reacted in overwhelming majority in a moderate way; although we, unfortunately, could observe some rather selective reading – I mean each party presenting those parts of the report, which were to their liking,” Tagliavini said.
This approach continued to prevail during the debates at PACE session after Tagliavini’s address with speakers from the Russian delegation focusing on Georgia’s responsibility for “triggering off the war” and the Georgian delegation members – on Russia’s responsibility for developments leading up to the war and ethnic cleansing.
“Those who were involved in the conflict were usually focusing only on their own truth; they were hardly ever sufficiently prepared to look at a truth of the others,” Tagliavini said.
She underlined that her fact-finding mission – the first of this kind in the EU history – was not leading an investigation relevant to judiciary proceeding of any sort.
“It was a strictly fact-finding mission,” Tagliavini said. “This report should not be seen as a tribunal and it was not preparing any legal action in favor or against any side or anyone.”
When she moved to laying out the mission’s key findings, Tagliavini started with, as she put it, “the answer to the question, which in the past has been asked most frequently.”
“In the mission’s view, it was Georgia, which triggered off the war, when it attacked Tskhinvali with heavy artillery on the night of 7 to 8 of August, 2008,” she said.
“None of the explanations, given by the Georgian authorities in order to provide some form of legal justification for the attack, landed valid explanation. In particular, to the best of the mission’s knowledge, there was no massive Russian military invasion underway, which had to be stopped by Georgian military forces shelling Tskhinvali.”
“It needs to be stressed, that the Georgian attack against Tskhinvali on the 7 to 8 of August, 2008 was by no means an isolated event. It was the culminating point of months and years of mounting tension, of armed incidents, and steadily deteriorating situation. All sides to the conflict bear responsibility for these evermore serious developments,” she said.
She said that although blame for triggering off the war lies on the Georgian side, Russia “too is to blame for a substantial number of violations of international law.”
“These include, even prior to the armed conflict, the mass conferral of Russian citizenship to a majority of the population living in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia. It also includes in terms of an additional violation of international law the military action by the Russian armed forces on Georgian territory far beyond the needs of a proportionate defense of Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali what come under Georgian attack. In addition, the Russian recognition of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states must be considered as being not valid in the context of international law and as violations of Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,” Tagliavini said.
She said that claims by Moscow and Tskhinvali that Georgia was carrying out “the genocide against the South Ossetian population are not substantiated.”
“On the other side, there is a serious indication that ethnic cleansing did take place in many instances against ethnic Georgians in the villages and settlements in South Ossetia, as well as other violations of international humanitarian law, which must be attributed to all sides,” she said.
“Furthermore, there are serious question marks behind the attitude of the Russian armed forces, who would not or could not stop atrocities committed by armed groups or even individuals fighting on the South Ossetian side against the civilian population in those territories, which were controlled by the Russian armed forces.”
She reiterated her call for “abstaining from assigning an overall responsibility” only to one side alone.
Tagliavini also said that the international community also had its share of responsibility.
She also said that international conflict management “was not successful” partly because of “a gradual erosion” of previously negotiated agreements and disrespect of international commitments.
She also criticized “passive and non-innovative approach to the peace processes” by OSCE and UN – organizations, which were present in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, respectively.
“When in early spring 2008 the international community eventually realized the seriousness of the situation and deployed intense high-level diplomacy with U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, EU High Representative Javier Solana and German Foreign Minister Frank Walter-Steinmeier, presenting one diplomatic initiative after the other, it was too late and not enough to prevent forthcoming crisis,” Tagliavini said.
“The series of misperception, missed opportunities and mistakes on all sides accumulated to a point that the danger of explosions and violence became real,” she added.
Debates
After Tagliavini’s address, debates were held during which head of the Georgian delegation Petre Tsiskarishvili told the Assembly that presence of Russian forces and shelling of Georgian villages in the conflict zone prior to the attack of Tskhinvali by the Georgian forces was already “the start of the war.”
“The inquiry [by Tagliavini commission] has proved that the Russian forces in consent with their Ossetian proxies have deliberately embarked on the campaign of ethnic cleansing of Georgians during and after the war. Second crucial part of this report is the passportization of citizens living on Georgia’s territory [in Abkhazia and South Ossetia],” MP Tsiskarishvili, who is leader of ruling majority in the Georgian Parliament, said.
“And last but not the least, which is very important for us, is that Russian troops – it was established by this mission – were on the territory, on the Georgian soil by August the 7th. It’s another question, whether substantial or unsubstantial forces, but the conventional Russian forces as well as paramilitary elements were ready on the Georgian territory.”
The report by the fact-finding mission, notes about the presence of “some Russian forces” in South Ossetia, other than the Russian peacekeepers, prior to 2:30pm of August 8, when Russia says it made a decision on intervention.
“To me the facts that I have just described are already start of the war,” he added.
Another speaker from the Georgian delegation, a ruling party MP Akaki Minashvili said that if it was Georgia, which started the war, “how it comes that in two hours, about ten thousand Russian soldiers were on Georgian territory – strange.”
“If we are the starters of the war, how it comes that Russia blocked eight peace proposals offered by the Georgian side and one of them was offered by [then] German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier,” MP Minashvili said.
MP Tsiskarishvili said that Russia’s policy towards Georgia was making the current situation “a classic zero-sum game”.
“Georgia either surrenders and becomes Russia’s backyard, or Russia wants to see it destroyed completely,” he said and added that through democratic reforms and international support Georgia would prevail.
Head of the Russian delegation at PACE, Konstantin Kosachev, told the Assembly that such a notion of “zero-sum game” would not help to resolve the conflict. He also said that he agreed with Heidi Tagliavini’s remarks that there were no winners from this conflict.
Initially PACE was expected to pass a resolution – the fourth since October, 2008 – about the consequences of the August war, but the process was stalled because of disagreements over the drafts.
Two preliminary drafts of the resolution were prepared, which, as one PACE members put it, “significantly differed from each other”. One was prepared by co-rapporteur on the matter Hungarian MP Mátyás Eörsi and the second one by another co-rapporteur, British MP David Wilshire. The latter was strongly criticized by Georgia for having a meeting with South Ossetian representative in so called embassy of breakaway region in Moscow. The Georgian delegations said that Wilshire’s decision agree on a meeting at that venue was putting a reason to question his objectivity in drafting of the resolution.
During the debates, David Wilshire told the Assembly that “one thing we can usefully do is try not to get hung up on terminology, on status and on which building the meeting takes place.” “We want to focus on what is achievable,” he added.
In a response to Wilshire’s remarks, Georgian lawmaker Akaki Minashvili said it was probably easy to say “let’s leave emotions back” for those people who “live in London and travel to Moscow”, but it was not easy in Georgia’s case as Russian artillery “is standing 40 kilometers away from Tbilisi, from our families and citizens.”
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Zusammenfassung – Band 2

- Was in der Presse nicht gesagt wurde -

von www.georgien-nachrichten.com

Der EU-Bericht erklärt im Kapitel 6 Teil 4 alle russischen Gewaltanwendungen als nicht gerechtfertigt, ebenso alle Gewaltanwendungen der Abchasen in Teil 5. Die Gewaltanwendungen der südossetischen Seite mit dem Beschießen georgischer Dörfer vor dem 7.8. verletzte das Gewaltverbot, welches für den Konflikt maßgeblich war. Die Gewaltanwendungen nach dem 12.8. nach dem Rückzug der georgischen Einheiten waren illegal.

In Teil 2 steht der Bericht Georgien das Eingreifen in Südossetien als gerechtfertigt zu als Selbstverteidigung in Form von „on-the-spot reaction“ und bezeichnet die georgische Offensive als nicht proportional zu dem einzigen erlaubten Ziel, zur Verteidigung gegen die andauernden südossetischen Angriffe.

Die georgische Sicht, dass russische Truppen vor dem 7./8. georgisches Territorium betreten hätten, konnte von der Kommission nicht bestätigt werden. Die Kommission schließt aber nicht aus, dass neue Beweise das Betreten Georgiens durch russische Soldaten zu diesem Zeitpunkt zeigen.

Der Bericht bestätigt auch die Anwesenheit regulärer russischer Streitkräfte in Südossetien vor dem 7.8. und die große Zahl an Provokationen zuvor auf georgischem Territorium. Die Kommission besteht im Kapitel 8 auf der Erfüllung des Sechs-Punkteabkommens, d.h. dem Rückzug der russischen Streitkräfte auf die Positionen vor dem 7.8. und stellt fest, dass dies Russland bis heute nicht erfüllt hat. Die Kommission nennt die Anerkennung Südossetiens und Abchasiens durch Russland einen "Anschlag auf die internationalen Anstrengungen zur Konfliktlösung".

EU-geförderter Bericht zum Augustkrieg 2008 – 30.09.2009 - Original-Textpassagen aus dem Bericht

Chapter 3 - Related Legal Issues

3.1. The Legal Status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia

III. Comment –Seite 136

South Ossetia should not be recognised, because the preconditions for statehood are not met.

Neither should Abkhazia be recognised. Although it shows the characteristics of statehood, the process of state-building as such is not legitimate, as Abkhazia never had a right to secession. Furthermore, Abkhazia does not meet basic requirements regarding human and minority rights, especially because it does not guarantee a right of safe return to IDPs/refugees.

Chapter 6 - Use of Force

Part 2: Use of force by Georgia 238

II. Legal qualification of the Georgian offensive - Seite 239:

… Consequently, a government is generally not prevented from using armed force in internal conflicts, e.g. against insurgents starting a civil war or against territorial entities fighting violently for

secession. …

Seite 244 – 246:

2. Legal assessment: “Armed attack” by South Ossetia on Georgia?

The underlying question is whether the military operations of the South Ossetian militia preceding the Georgian air and ground offensive constituted an “armed attack” on Georgia which could justify the use of force by Georgia as an act of self-defence based on Art. 51 of 53 See Chapter 5 “Military Events of 2008”. …

a) Attacks on Georgian villages by South Ossetian forces as “armed attack” on Georgia

… The attacks on Georgian villages (Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikozi, Avnevi, Nuli, Ergneti,

Eredvi and Zemo Prisi) by South Ossetian forces can be qualified as equivalent to an “attack by the armed forces of a State on the territory of another State” resembling the situations described in Art. 3(a) of UN Resolution 3314. In this context, the delineation of the territories of South Ossetia and Georgia follows de facto jurisdiction of the South Ossetian entity short of statehood. Because the Georgian villages attacked by South Ossetian forces were not under the jurisdiction of South Ossetia before 8 August 2008, the actions by the South Ossetian militia are equivalent to an attack on the “territory of another State”.

To the extent that heavy artillery was used, the attacks against Georgian villages by South

Ossetia can also be qualified as “bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State” (cf. Resolution 3314, Art. 3(b)). These acts were serious and surpassed a threshold of gravity and therefore also constituted an “armed attack” in terms of Art. 51 of the UN Charter.” in terms of Art. 51 of the UN Charter. …

b) South Ossetian attacks on the Georgian peacekeepers and police as an “armed

attack”

The South Ossetian attacks on the villages were primarily directed against Georgian peacekeepers and against Georgian police. This constitutes an attack by the armed forces of

South Ossetia on the land forces of Georgia, as also described in Art. 3 (d) UN Resolution

3314.61

c) Military action by South Ossetia beyond a minimum threshold

… There may be military operations which amount to a use of force but nevertheless do not yet

constitute an armed attack in the sense of Art. 51 of the UN Charter. To be deemed an armed

attack, an operation must have a minimum “scale and effects”. …

It can therefore be assumed that the South Ossetian attacks on Georgian villages as well as on Georgian peacekeepers and police had a minimum scale and effects, but further conditions must be met in order to allow for the Georgian claim of self-defence, which will discussed next. …

3. Burden of proof for the armed attack

The problem remains that it cannot be clearly determined which side began the fighting prior

to the Georgian air and ground offensive. The situation was highly explosive, and both sides

seem to have prepared for use of force and were ready to use force. It is impossible to decide

who fired the first shot in the incidents noted above. …

When Georgia argues that its air and ground offensive on 7 August 2008 is justified by self-defence because of a cumulative armed attack by South-Ossetia, the burden of proof falls on Georgia.

IV. Conclusions: no self-defence by Georgia beyond on-the-spot reactions

To the extent that the attacks on Georgian villages, police and peacekeepers were conducted by South Ossetian militia, self-defence in the form of on-the-spot reactions by Georgian troops was necessary and proportionate and thus justified under international law.

On the other hand, the offensive that started on 7 August, even if it were deemed necessary, was not proportionate to the only permissible aim, the defence against the on-going attacks from South Ossetia.

Chapter 6 - Use of Force

Part 3: Use of force by South Ossetia against Georgia – ab Seite 262

I. Facts

As explained above, the South Ossetian militia were involved in shooting at Georgian villages, police and peacekeepers before the outbreak of the armed conflict. After the air and ground offensive by the Georgian army the South Ossetian militia probably tried to defend their positions.

II. Legal qualification: use of force, but partly justified as self-defence

To the extent that South Ossetian militia initiated the shooting on Georgian villages, police and peacekeepers before the outbreak of the armed conflict, South Ossetia violated the prohibition of the use of force, which was applicable to the conflict.

South Ossetian use of force could have been justified as self-defence only in the event of an armed attack by Georgia on South Ossetia. ... Use of force by South Ossetia after 12 August 2008 is not justifiable as self-defence, because there was no longer any on-going attack by Georgia. A ceasefire agreement had been concluded. The Georgian army had by that time retreated from the territory of South Ossetia. Use of force was therefore illegal from the ius ad bellum perspective. ...

Part 4: Use of force by Russia against Georgia

I. Facts

Russia was involved in the conflict in several ways. First, Russian peacekeepers who were stationed in South Ossetia on the basis of the Sochi Agreement were involved in the fighting in Tskhinvali. Second, Russian regular troops were fighting in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and deeper in Georgian territory. Third, North Caucasian irregulars took part in the fighting. Finally, Russia supported Abkhaz and South Ossetian forces in many ways, especially by

training, arming, equipping, financing and supporting them.

II. Legal qualification of the Russian involvement in the conflict

Under Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter and the parallel customary law, the military operations of the Russian army as described in Chapter 5 “Military Events of 2008”130 in the territory of Georgia (including South Ossetia and Abkhazia and elsewhere in Georgia) in August 2008 constituted a violation of the fundamental international legal prohibition of the use of force. The main legal issue is whether these activities could be justified as legally recognized exceptions.

III. No justification of the use of force as self-defence

... The means employed by Russia were not in a reasonable relationship to the only permissible

objective, which was to eliminate the threat for Russian peacekeepers. In any case, much of

the destruction (see Chapter 5 “Military Events in 2008”) after the conclusion of the ceasefire

agreement is not justifiable by any means. According to international law, the Russian

military action taken as a whole was therefore neither necessary nor proportionate to protect

Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia.

IV. No justification of Russian use of force as fulfilment of the peacekeeping mission

… Conclusion: Russia could not justify its use of force as a mere reinforcement and fulfilment

of its peacekeeping mission.

V. No justification of the use of force by invitation of the South Ossetian authorities

… To conclude, both under the doctrine of asymmetry and under the new doctrine of negative equality concerning intervention in a civil war, the South Ossetian authorities could not validly invite Russia to support them by military means.

VI. No justification of the use of force by collective self-defence

… Russian military activities against the Georgian military forces were not justified as collective self-defence under international law.

VII. No justification of the use of force as “humanitarian intervention”

To conclude, the Russian use of force cannot be justified as a humanitarian intervention.

VIII. No justification of the use of force as action to rescue and protect nationals abroad

In conclusion, the Russian intervention in Georgia cannot be justified as a rescue operation for Russian nationals in Georgia.

Part 5: Use of force in Abkhazia

II. Legal qualification of the Abkhaz and Russian offensive: violation of the prohibition of the use of force and armed attack on Georgia

III. Legal qualification of the Georgian operation: self-defence

The military operation in the upper Kodori Valley was, for the reasons just explained, an armed attack on Georgia. The use of force by Georgia was justified as self-defence.

IV. No justification of the Abkhaz and Russian use of force against Georgia

... All these arguments can constitute a legally permissible justification only to the extent that

they point to an armed attack by Georgia on Abkhazia. Only in the event of an armed attack

by Georgia … could Abkhazia have relied on selfdefence. Russian involvement could not be justified as collective self-defence in favour of Abkhazia, because third-party involvement in an internal military conflict in support of the seceding

party is not allowed for the reasons explained above. ...

2. No previous “armed attack” by Georgia

a) No Georgian military operation in the Kodori Valley by Georgia

b) No preceding terrorist attacks sponsored by Georgiab) No preceding terrorist attacks sponsored by Georgia

c) No imminent armed attack on Abkhazia as a whole by Georgia

4. Conclusion

The use of force by Abkhazia was not justified under international law and was thus illegal.

The same applies to the Russian support for Abkhaz use of force.

Chapter 8 - Back to Diplomacy

On 12 August, the Russian Government reported to the European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, that “the aim of Russia’s operation to force the Georgian side to peace had been achieved and it had been decided to conclude the operation”. Later that day President Medvedev met with President Sarkozy, who presented a ceasefire plan on behalf of the EU after telephone consultations with President Bush, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other European leaders. President Medvedev reportedly backed some elements of the plan. French Foreign Minister Kouchner then flew to Tbilisi to present the proposals to the Georgian side. Presidents Medvedev and Saakashvili consulted by phone and reportedly agreed to a six-point peace plan. It called for all parties to the conflict to accept the following conditions :

• to refrain from the use of force;

• to end hostilities definitively;

• to provide free access for humanitarian aid;

• Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;

• Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures;

• opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

As long as international mechanisms were not put into place, Russian peacekeepers patrolled in a large so-called buffer zone outside South Ossetia. The plan did not specifically state that international peacekeepers would be deployed within South Ossetia.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia agreed to and signed this ceasefire plan on 14 August 2008. The same day Georgia initiated the legal procedure for the cancellation of its membership within the CIS, finally taking a step which had been discussed for years. On 22 August, several Western media reported sizeable but not complete Russian military withdrawal from “Georgia proper”. Diverging interpretations of the status quo ante bellum called for a follow-on ceasefire agreement.

A diplomatic event called the six- point peace plan into even greater question. On 25 August, Russia’s Federation Council and the State Duma recommended that the President recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Even at this point some Russian and Western experts did not believe that the Kremlin would follow this recommendation. However, in an announcement on 26 August, President Medvedev announced Russia’s official recognition of the independence of both regions, and he called on other countries to follow this diplomatic step. On 5 September, Nicaragua recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Within Russian-dominated regional formats like the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) no government followed suit . At a late August 2008 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) the communiqué appeared to reflect disapproval of recognition of the breakaway regions. After the armed conflict, Russian President Medvedev formulated a doctrine of privileged zones of interest.

On 8 September, President Sarkozy and President Medvedev signed a follow-on ceasefire agreement setting out the provisions of the six point plan in detail. It provided for measures on the withdrawal of armed forces and for international monitoring mechanisms. It also referred to the continuation of the activities of the international observers of UNOMIG and OSCE Mission to Georgia. This should happen within their existing mandates and would be subject to further adjustments by respectively the UN Security Council and the OSCE Permanent Council. International observers, including at least 200 from the EU, would have to be deployed in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Thus the EU became a guarantor of the principle of the non-use of force. The agreement also referred to the holding of international discussions, as provided for in the six point plan, to begin in Geneva on 15 October 2008.

Russian troops withdrew from Poti and Senaki on 13 September and pulled back by 9 October from so-called buffer zones in accordance with the follow-on ceasefire plan. However, only one day after this plan was agreed upon, the Russian Defence Minister asserted that several thousand Russian troops would remain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, Russian checkpoints remained in some areas like the Akhalgori district in the eastern part of South Ossetia, which had been administered by Georgia before the August 2008 armed conflict. Thus Russia did not follow the call to pull back its troops to the pre-war level.

Moreover the Kremlin’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the basis of the Kosovo precedent formula has an impact on international conflict resolution efforts. The newly-created Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) defined its area of action as “throughout Georgia” or “the whole of Georgia”, but did not obtain free access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It soon became clear that Russia and its protégés in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali did not grant access to international observers to both regions. This limitation had serious consequences for a mission like the EUMM. Without access to both regions it could not fulfil its task to monitor the post-war stabilisation process in Georgia and the implementation of the ceasefire accords. Limited in this way in its area of action to the “adjacent regions” around Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EUMM would be contributing to the safeguarding of de facto borders not recognised by Europe and the rest of the world, with the exception of Russia and Nicaragua. Thus the post-war stabilisation process in Georgia was based on a rather uncertain foundation.

The international discussions on Georgia began at the United Nations in Geneva with a first meeting on 15 October 2008, with the full involvement of the European Union, the United Nations and the OSCE.

Stichworte: Georgien, Abchasien, Süd-Ossetien, Russland, Krieg-2008, Sprache: deutsch, englisch, Archiv: #

Georg. Abgeordnete senden int. Appell an Abgeordnete von 31 Ländern: Abchasien und Südossetien sollen als von Russland besetzte Gebiete erklärt werden

08.04.2010 | Civil.ge | Link zur Quelle | Bilder | Video |

Georgian parliamentary committee for foreign relations has requested lawmakers from 31 countries to “declare the two Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as being territories under Russian occupation and recognise the ethnic cleansing committed by Russia” in those territories.
“We sincerely hope that you can adopt appropriate statements of support on these matters,” a letter by the parliamentary committee reads.
The letter, according to the parliamentary committee for foreign relations, was sent to its counterpart committees of legislative bodies from 20 EU-member states, plus Norway and Island, as well as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, New Zeeland, South Korea, Japan, Israel and the United States.
“Russian policy continues to pursue the systematic undermining of Georgian sovereignty, the increased militarization of the territories Moscow has occupied, and the justification of ethnic cleansing campaigns used against Georgians in those territories. All components of this policy seek to derail Georgia’s progress and ongoing efforts at reform, as well as Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic foreign policy alignment,” the letter reads.

Brief vom Kommittee für auswärtige Beziehungen des georgischen Parlaments
Letter by Georgian Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Relations
Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 8 Apr.'10 / 19:13
The Georgian Parliament is genuinely grateful for your support of the non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent territories following the Russian invasion of Georgia and the occupation of these territories.
With this letter, we aim to update you on the current state of the Russian occupation. We also seek the continued vigilance and action of your Parliament and your committee in helping reverse the consequences of last year’s invasion – consequences that are grave not only for Georgia, but potentially dangerous for all of Europe.
Today, more than one year after the Russian invasion, Georgia finds itself in a promising, yet profoundly precarious, situation. On the one hand, our commitment to deepening democratic reforms remains unshakeable. We have strengthened the roles of the Parliament, the judiciary, and the media, while also improving our electoral code and undertaking a constitutional reform process. Our fight against corruption continues unabated, and we are especially proud that Transparency International’s recent Corruption Barometer survey put Georgia on par with northern European countries. Meanwhile, we continue to pursue reforms that will further enhance the ease of doing business in Georgia to attract more foreign investors.
On the other hand, Russia still occupies 20 percent of Georgian territory—including areas controlled by the Georgian government before August 2008. This is in direct violation of the ceasefire agreement brokered by President Sarkozy and the fundamental norms of international law. In fact, Russia remains in full or partial violation of every single point of the six-point Sarkozy ceasefire agreement: Moscow is building three large-scale (including air and naval) military bases in the occupied territories, as well as numerous smaller military installations, which include long-range artillery and strategic missiles (SS 21 and SS 26). Incidents of Russian military warplanes, helicopters, and reconnaissance aircraft violating Georgian air space have increased. Russia has also illegally deployed squadrons of patrol boats in the Abkhazian section of Georgian territorial waters.
The EU-mandated Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) last fall found Russia responsible for ethnic cleansing in these territories. But Russia has refused to reverse the results of this cleansing and to allow its victims to return home. In addition to finding Russia culpable of ethnic cleansing during and after its 2008 invasion, the EU-mandated mission also established that those acts qualify as crimes against humanity (Part II, Ch 7, pp 393-394). Meanwhile, Resolution 1633 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also established that the Russian Federation bears responsibility for the above acts. The Russian-sponsored campaign to remove Georgians from Abkhazia in the 1990s, which deprived this province of up to 75 percent of its pre-war population, was recognized as ethnic cleansing by heads of states of the OSCE in Budapest (1994), Lisbon (1996) and Istanbul (1999), as well as by the UN General Assembly in 2008.
Notwithstanding the incident-prevention mechanism agreed to at the Geneva talks, Russian troops have consistently engaged in the kidnapping of Georgian citizens from Georgian territory adjacent to the occupied regions, including a number of teenagers who were held in illegal detention for more than a month. Russian FSB Border Forces deployed alongside the administrative boundary seek to cement the isolation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia by denying individuals living in these territories the freedom of movement. Last but not least, in open violation of the EU-brokered ceasefire, Russia still refuses to allow the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) access to the occupied territories.
Russian policy continues to pursue the systematic undermining of Georgian sovereignty, the increased militarization of the territories Moscow has occupied, and the justification of ethnic cleansing campaigns used against Georgians in those territories. All components of this policy seek to derail Georgia’s progress and ongoing efforts at reform, as well as Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic foreign policy alignment.
It is our strong belief that Moscow’s attempt to change borders by force is not only illegal but threatens the most important principles of post-WWII European security agreements, including those outlined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. We are therefore grateful that you stand with us in the non-recognition of the “status quo” achieved by force. Only consistent international pressure and dialogue can force the reconsideration of such policies. We strongly believe that an increased international presence on the ground – including by granting the EUMM access to these territories and by considering the deployment of an international police force – is the only path to true stability.
The alternative to pursuing the reversal of the ethnic cleansing campaign is allowing the Russian narrative, which seeks to legalise Moscow’s actions, to set a new baseline for others who seek to operate through such actions in the future. Europe saw so much of this in the 20th century. We cannot allow this to be the way of this new century, as well.
It is in this context that we appeal to your committee and your parliament to:
* Reinforce the non-recognition policy with clear reference to international law;
* Declare the two Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as being territories under Russian occupation and recognise the ethnic cleansing committed by Russia (based on Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949; the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; and to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977).
We may not be able to push the occupying power out of the occupied territories imminently, but we are responsible, as members of the UN, CoE and the OSCE, as well as parties of the Geneva convention and its protocols, to constantly remind the occupying force of its responsibilities.
We believe the facts are clear, and that they speak for themselves. We count on your understanding and trust your support to ensure the strict implementation of the EU-brokered ceasefire agreement and to uphold the most basic principles of international law.
We sincerely hope that you can adopt appropriate statements of support on these matters. While the outcome of this situation is vital to the future of Georgia, we also believe that it is vital to the future of the European community and the principles that have led to peace and prosperity across much of the continent.

Stichworte: Georgien, Abchasien, Süd-Ossetien, Russland, Krieg-2008, Sprache: deutsch, englisch, Archiv: #