24.06.2010 | Civil.ge | Link zur Quelle | Bilder | Video |
Außenminister Vashadze zu den "Beziehungen zwischen Netzwerken des organisierten Verbrechens und Gruppen der außerparlamentarischen Opposition in Georgien", was zuvor in der dt. Presse berichtet wurde:
The Georgian authorities were aware of links between Europe-based Georgian-organized crime network and “marginal opposition” groups in Georgian opposition well before it was reported in the German press, Grigol Vashadze, the Georgian foreign minister, said on June 24.
The German daily, Frankfurter Rundschau, reported this week, citing a 66-page report by the Austrian Federal Criminal Police Office, that last year Georgian opposition groups, whose identities are not revealed in the article, were in contact with the Georgian-organized crime network through an owner of a Georgian restaurant in Vienna, who acted as a go-between. According to the same report the Austrian police concluded based on phone tapping records, that the criminal network aimed at using the opposition street protest last spring and summer, to overthrow President Saakashvili’s government.
According to the same report the network tried to use assistance from “senior Interior Ministry officials” as well in reaching its goal. Vienna-based members of the network were also in contact with Georgian embassy and consulate employees, receiving information from them, according to the report.
“Our [diplomatic] mission in Vienna had a meeting with relevant Austrian authorities and the Austrian side expressed deep regret that the information was leaked to the media, before these materials were sent to court,” Grigol Vashadze, the Georgian foreign minister, said at a joint news conference with his Austrian counterpart, Michael Spindelegger, in Tbilisi.
“As far as links between Vienna-based some criminals and so called opposition, marginal opposition is concerned, we’ve been speaking about it for a long time already and there is nothing surprising in [this report],” Vashadze added.
The Austrian Foreign Minister said that he was not aware of details of this report, but would request information about it from the Austrian Interior Ministry after he returns back to Vienna.
The Frankfurter Rundschau also reported, citing the Austrian police report, that the owner of Georgian restaurant in Vienna, who acted a go-between, was also in contact with Moscow-based ex-Georgian security chief, Igor Giorgadze, who is wanted in Georgia for assassination attempt against ex-President Eduard Shevardnadze fifteen years ago.
Dozens of persons, identified as members of Georgian mafia in Europe, were arrested in a coordinated operation in Europe in mid-March, 2010. The arrests, which took place in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, France, Spain and Italy, were part of a year-long operation codenamed Java.
Lasha Shushanashvili, identified as boss of the Georgian-organized crime network in Europe, could escape the arrest in Greece. The Frankfurter Rundschau reported, citing the Austrian police report, that attempts by the Shushanashvili’s network to meddle in Georgia’s political developments was revealed as a result of investigations in frames of Java operation.
The Frankfurter Rundschau wrote that the Austrian police was well aware of political sensitivity of the matter and it was not yet clear whether phone tapping records would be sent to court along with other evidence against the Georgian criminal network members.
Wiener Ermittler: Georgiens Mafia plante Umsturz - 22.06.2010, Frankfurter Rundschau
Bei den Protesten in Georgien gegen Präsident Michail Saakaschwili vor einem Jahr sollen einflussreiche Verbrecherkartelle eine maßgebliche Rolle gespielt haben. ... Aus einem Ermittlungsbericht des österreichischen Bundeskriminalamtes (BKA): ... "Dieser Giorgadze ist bestrebt, einen Umsturz in Georgien herbeizuführen, indem Demonstrationen organisiert und durch Provokationen Polizeikräfte zu Gewaltausbrüchen verleitet werden sollen."... Igor Giorgadze lebt in Moskau und war bis 2005 georgischer Staatssicherheitsminister, als er nach einem gescheiterten Anschlag gegen den Präsidenten Schewardnadse nach Russland flüchtete. Georgien fahndet über Interpol mit internationalem Haftbefehl nach Giorgadze. ...
Stichworte: Georgien, Innenpolitik, Sprache: deutsch, englisch, Archiv: #
Deutsche Wirtschaftsvereinigung Georgien veröffentlicht neue Kurzstudien
22.06.2010 | DWVG | Link zur Quelle | Bilder | Video |
Die Deutsche Wirtschaftsvereinigung Georgien (DWVG) präsentiert drei neue Kurzstudien innerhalb der hauseigenen Reihe „Georgien Kompakt“. In den neu erschienenen Berichten werden die Bereiche Gesundheitssektor, Unternehmensgründung sowie das Europäische Nachbarschaftsprogramm ENPI thematisiert. Die aktuelle Situation des georgischen Gesundheitssektors, Registrierungsformalitäten bei der Unternehmensgründung sowie Vergabeverfahren, Zuständigkeiten, der Weg zur Förderung und Antragsrichtlinien innerhalb des Programms ENPI sind Gegenstand der vier bis acht Seiten um-fassenden Studien. Die kostenlosen Publikationen stehen auf der Homepage der DWVG zum Download bereit:
“Georgien Kompakt: Gesundheitssektor”. Die achtseitige Kurzstudie gibt einen Einblick über die aktuelle Situation des Gesundheitssektors in Georgien.
“Georgien Kompakt: Unternehmensgründung”. Die fünfseitige Kurzstudie bietet Einsicht über Registrierungsformalitäten bei der Unternehmensgründung in Georgien.
“Georgien Kompakt: Eurpäisches Nachbarschaftsprogramm ENPI”. Die vierseitige Kurzstudie gibt einen Überblick über Vergabeverfahren und Zuständigkeiten, den Weg zur Förderung und Antragsrichtlinien.
Georgien Kompakt: Gesundheitssektor
Georgien Kompakt: Unternehmensgründung
Georgien Kompakt: Europäisches Nachbarschaftsprogramm ENPI
Stichworte: Georgien, Deutschland, Sprache: deutsch, Archiv: #
Die Deutsche Wirtschaftsvereinigung Georgien (DWVG) präsentiert drei neue Kurzstudien innerhalb der hauseigenen Reihe „Georgien Kompakt“. In den neu erschienenen Berichten werden die Bereiche Gesundheitssektor, Unternehmensgründung sowie das Europäische Nachbarschaftsprogramm ENPI thematisiert. Die aktuelle Situation des georgischen Gesundheitssektors, Registrierungsformalitäten bei der Unternehmensgründung sowie Vergabeverfahren, Zuständigkeiten, der Weg zur Förderung und Antragsrichtlinien innerhalb des Programms ENPI sind Gegenstand der vier bis acht Seiten um-fassenden Studien. Die kostenlosen Publikationen stehen auf der Homepage der DWVG zum Download bereit:
“Georgien Kompakt: Gesundheitssektor”. Die achtseitige Kurzstudie gibt einen Einblick über die aktuelle Situation des Gesundheitssektors in Georgien.
“Georgien Kompakt: Unternehmensgründung”. Die fünfseitige Kurzstudie bietet Einsicht über Registrierungsformalitäten bei der Unternehmensgründung in Georgien.
“Georgien Kompakt: Eurpäisches Nachbarschaftsprogramm ENPI”. Die vierseitige Kurzstudie gibt einen Überblick über Vergabeverfahren und Zuständigkeiten, den Weg zur Förderung und Antragsrichtlinien.
Georgien Kompakt: Gesundheitssektor
Georgien Kompakt: Unternehmensgründung
Georgien Kompakt: Europäisches Nachbarschaftsprogramm ENPI
Stichworte: Georgien, Deutschland, Sprache: deutsch, Archiv: #
International Crisis Group (ICG) legt Bericht zur Abhängigkeit Tskhinvali’s von Russland vor
07.06.2010 | Civil.ge | Link zur Quelle | Bilder | Video |
Media release: South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition - Tskhinvali/Tbilisi/Istanbul/Moscow/Brussels
All parties involved in the South Ossetia conflict should work to ensure freedom of movement and other basic cooperative mechanisms without status or other political preconditions, so as to reduce the risk of instability and meet basic local needs.
South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition , the latest report from the International Crisis Group, is based on extensive field research in the isolated entity. It examines economic, political and security situation and the extent of dominance from Moscow, especially since the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. Only four countries, including Russia, have recognised the tiny breakaway territory that Crisis Group found enjoys no more independence than it did before the conflict
All other countries consider South Ossetia an integral part of Georgia, and its prospects for true independence are poor. The war dealt a heavy physical, economic, demographic and political blow. The permanent population – shrinking since the early 1990’s – now is unlikely to be much more than 30,000. Due to corruption, the $840 million Russia has so far contributed has not significantly improved local conditions. With traditional trading routes to the rest of Georgia closed, the economy has been reduced to little more than a service provider for the Russian military and construction personnel.
“Recognition of South Ossetia as an independent state actually has consolidated its dependence”, says Lawrence Sheets, Crisis Group’s Caucasus Project Director. “Since 2008, South Ossetia’s situation closely mirrors that of Russia’s North Caucasus republics with 99 per cent of its budget and half its government staff coming from Russia”.
In violation of the 2008 ceasefire accords, Russia keeps excess troops in the region and blocks virtually all access to international organisations, including the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). It should fully implement its international commitments and encourage the Ossetians to engage with Georgian authorities on issues including free movement of people and goods, security and step-by-step return of the approximately 20,000 ethnic Georgians who remain displaced.
To avoid turning South Ossetia into a “no man’s land”, all sides should focus on the population’s practical needs and grievances. Moscow should put strict controls on its financial transfers and tackle corruption and human rights violations by local authorities. International organisations should continue or renew contacts with the de facto local authorities and civil society and keep engaging with Russia and Georgia on South Ossetia.
Georgia should look for ways to engage with Ossetians by actively supporting free movement and small-scale economic activity for locals across the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL), as well as encourage the EU, UN, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other bodies to develop initiatives to loosen South Ossetian dependence on Russia.
“It will take a long time to rebuild any trust between the Ossetians and Georgians”, said Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Europe Program Director. “Only the example of a prosperous and democratic state, responsive to human rights issues in the breakaway regions and the grievances of its national minorities, may eventually encourage South Ossetians to regain trust in Georgia”.
South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition
Europe Report Nº205 7 Jun 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
South Ossetia is no closer to genuine independence now than in August 2008, when Russia went to war with Georgia and extended recognition. The small, rural territory lacks even true political, economic or military autonomy. Moscow staffs over half the government, donates 99 per cent of the budget and provides security. South Ossetians themselves often urge integration into the Russian Federation, and their entity’s situation closely mirrors that of Russia’s North Caucasus republics. Regardless of the slow pace of post-conflict reconstruction, extensive high-level corruption and dire socio-economic indicators, there is little interest in closer ties with Georgia. Moscow has not kept important ceasefire commitments, and some 20,000 ethnic Georgians from the region remain forcibly displaced. At a minimum, Russians, Ossetians and Georgians need to begin addressing the local population’s basic needs by focusing on creating freedom of movement and economic and humanitarian links without status preconditions.
The war dealt a heavy physical, economic, demographic and political blow to South Ossetia. The permanent population had been shrinking since the early 1990s and now is unlikely to be much more than 30,000. The $840 million Russia has contributed in rehabilitation assistance and budgetary support has not significantly improved local conditions. With its traditional trading routes to the rest of Georgia closed, the small Ossetian economy has been reduced to little more than a service provider for the Russian military and construction personnel. Other than the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), no international humanitarian, development or monitoring organisation operates in the region; dependent on a single unreliable road to Russia, the inhabitants are isolated.
Claims and counterclaims about misappropriation of reconstruction funds complicate the relationship between the de facto president, Eduard Kokoity, and his Russian prime minister and undermine internal cohesion. While Russia controls decision-making in several key spheres, such as the border, public order and external relations, it has allowed South Ossetian elites a degree of manoeuvre on such internal matters as rehabilitation, reconstruction, education and local justice. Preoccupied with security threats on its own North Caucasus territory, Moscow has preferred to work with Kokoity and his entourage, who have shown unshakeable loyalty, rather than try a different leadership.
All but four countries, including Russia, continue to recognise South Ossetia as part of Georgia, and Ossetians and Georgians cannot avoid addressing common problems much longer. Lack of freedom of movement and detentions of people trying to cross the administrative boundary line (ABL) spoil the lives of all, regardless of ethnicity and risk increasing tensions. The EU monitoring mission (EUMM) in Georgia could play a vital role in promoting stability and acting as a deterrent to further military action, but with Russia and South Ossetia resisting its access, its effectiveness and response capability is limited.
Periodic talks in Geneva bring Russia, Georgia and representatives from South Ossetia and Abkhazia together but are bogged down over the inability to conclude an agreement on the non-use of force. Much less effort has been made to initiate incremental, practical measures that would address humanitarian needs. Positions on status are irreconcilable for the present and should be set aside. The immediate focus instead should be on securing freedom of movement for the local population and humanitarian and development organisations, which all parties are blocking to various degrees. The South Ossetians should be pressed to respect the right to return of ethnic Georgians, while Tbilisi should be more supportive of the few who either stayed in South Ossetia or have been able to go home. The Ossetians should lift their conditionality on the work of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) that has been created to deal with day-to-day issues along the ABL.
It will take a long time to rebuild any trust between the South Ossetians and Georgians, but a start is needed on steps that can make the confrontation more bearable for the people and less risky for regional stability.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To All Sides:
1. Agree urgently, without posing status or other political preconditions, on basic cooperation mechanisms and implementation modalities to ensure:
a) movement across the administrative boundary line (ABL) for local inhabitants and humanitarian and developmental organisations;
b) rights to property and return; and
c) economic freedom.
To the Government of the Russian Federation:
2. Implement fully the ceasefire agreements, which oblige Russia to reduce troop levels to those mandated before 8 August 2008, withdraw from previously unoccupied areas and allow access for international monitoring and humanitarian assistance missions to South Ossetia, particularly the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM).
3. Encourage the South Ossetian authorities to engage with the Georgian government to lower tensions and prevent incidents in the conflict zone and to participate in the joint IPRM.
4. Ensure that the right of return for Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs) is recognised; facilitate their return to South Ossetia; and monitor and prevent human rights violations in South Ossetia.
5. Put strict controls on all transfers from the Russian federal budget to South Ossetia to limit corruption.
To the Government of Georgia:
6. Define, publicise and implement a generous policy on movement across the ABL for all residents, while continuing both to refrain from arbitrary detention of South Ossetian residents and to cooperate with international bodies (Council of Europe, ICRC, EUMM) in investigating cases of missing and detained people.
7. Facilitate small-scale economic activity across the ABL; encourage the EU, UN, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international bodies to develop initiatives to loosen South Ossetian dependence on Russia; and apply the Law on Occupied Territories to support these activities in line with the new State Strategy on Engagement through Cooperation.
To the Authorities in South Ossetia:
8. Refrain from arbitrary detentions of Georgian citizens and violation of their freedom of movement; release those detained since the August 2008 war; and cooperate with international mediators in investigating cases of missing and detained people.
9. Recognise the rights of Georgian IDPs and facilitate their step-by-step return.
10. Allow the EUMM and other international officials and organisations full access to South Ossetia.
11. Discuss day-to-day issues and security with Georgia; facilitate small-scale economic and social activities across the ABL; and resume participation in the joint IPRM.
12. Put priority on eradicating high-level corruption; pursue those who embezzle reconstruction assistance; and allow greater freedom for civil society initiatives.
To the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe and other international actors:
13. Engage with Russian authorities in support of full implementation of the 2008 ceasefire agreements.
14. Continue or renew contacts with authorities and civil society groups in South Ossetia; support dialogue between Georgian and South Ossetian authorities, as well as Georgian and South Ossetian civil society groups.
15. Continue efforts to monitor the human rights situation, with a special focus on freedom of movement, arbitrary detentions and political and socio-economic rights; and advocate the implementation of international norms and principles, including the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
Tskhinvali/Tbilisi/Istanbul/Moscow/Brussels, 7 June 2010
Stichworte: Georgien, Süd-Ossetien, Russland, Krieg-2008, Archiv: #
Media release: South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition - Tskhinvali/Tbilisi/Istanbul/Moscow/Brussels
All parties involved in the South Ossetia conflict should work to ensure freedom of movement and other basic cooperative mechanisms without status or other political preconditions, so as to reduce the risk of instability and meet basic local needs.
South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition , the latest report from the International Crisis Group, is based on extensive field research in the isolated entity. It examines economic, political and security situation and the extent of dominance from Moscow, especially since the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. Only four countries, including Russia, have recognised the tiny breakaway territory that Crisis Group found enjoys no more independence than it did before the conflict
All other countries consider South Ossetia an integral part of Georgia, and its prospects for true independence are poor. The war dealt a heavy physical, economic, demographic and political blow. The permanent population – shrinking since the early 1990’s – now is unlikely to be much more than 30,000. Due to corruption, the $840 million Russia has so far contributed has not significantly improved local conditions. With traditional trading routes to the rest of Georgia closed, the economy has been reduced to little more than a service provider for the Russian military and construction personnel.
“Recognition of South Ossetia as an independent state actually has consolidated its dependence”, says Lawrence Sheets, Crisis Group’s Caucasus Project Director. “Since 2008, South Ossetia’s situation closely mirrors that of Russia’s North Caucasus republics with 99 per cent of its budget and half its government staff coming from Russia”.
In violation of the 2008 ceasefire accords, Russia keeps excess troops in the region and blocks virtually all access to international organisations, including the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). It should fully implement its international commitments and encourage the Ossetians to engage with Georgian authorities on issues including free movement of people and goods, security and step-by-step return of the approximately 20,000 ethnic Georgians who remain displaced.
To avoid turning South Ossetia into a “no man’s land”, all sides should focus on the population’s practical needs and grievances. Moscow should put strict controls on its financial transfers and tackle corruption and human rights violations by local authorities. International organisations should continue or renew contacts with the de facto local authorities and civil society and keep engaging with Russia and Georgia on South Ossetia.
Georgia should look for ways to engage with Ossetians by actively supporting free movement and small-scale economic activity for locals across the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL), as well as encourage the EU, UN, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other bodies to develop initiatives to loosen South Ossetian dependence on Russia.
“It will take a long time to rebuild any trust between the Ossetians and Georgians”, said Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Europe Program Director. “Only the example of a prosperous and democratic state, responsive to human rights issues in the breakaway regions and the grievances of its national minorities, may eventually encourage South Ossetians to regain trust in Georgia”.
South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition
Europe Report Nº205 7 Jun 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
South Ossetia is no closer to genuine independence now than in August 2008, when Russia went to war with Georgia and extended recognition. The small, rural territory lacks even true political, economic or military autonomy. Moscow staffs over half the government, donates 99 per cent of the budget and provides security. South Ossetians themselves often urge integration into the Russian Federation, and their entity’s situation closely mirrors that of Russia’s North Caucasus republics. Regardless of the slow pace of post-conflict reconstruction, extensive high-level corruption and dire socio-economic indicators, there is little interest in closer ties with Georgia. Moscow has not kept important ceasefire commitments, and some 20,000 ethnic Georgians from the region remain forcibly displaced. At a minimum, Russians, Ossetians and Georgians need to begin addressing the local population’s basic needs by focusing on creating freedom of movement and economic and humanitarian links without status preconditions.
The war dealt a heavy physical, economic, demographic and political blow to South Ossetia. The permanent population had been shrinking since the early 1990s and now is unlikely to be much more than 30,000. The $840 million Russia has contributed in rehabilitation assistance and budgetary support has not significantly improved local conditions. With its traditional trading routes to the rest of Georgia closed, the small Ossetian economy has been reduced to little more than a service provider for the Russian military and construction personnel. Other than the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), no international humanitarian, development or monitoring organisation operates in the region; dependent on a single unreliable road to Russia, the inhabitants are isolated.
Claims and counterclaims about misappropriation of reconstruction funds complicate the relationship between the de facto president, Eduard Kokoity, and his Russian prime minister and undermine internal cohesion. While Russia controls decision-making in several key spheres, such as the border, public order and external relations, it has allowed South Ossetian elites a degree of manoeuvre on such internal matters as rehabilitation, reconstruction, education and local justice. Preoccupied with security threats on its own North Caucasus territory, Moscow has preferred to work with Kokoity and his entourage, who have shown unshakeable loyalty, rather than try a different leadership.
All but four countries, including Russia, continue to recognise South Ossetia as part of Georgia, and Ossetians and Georgians cannot avoid addressing common problems much longer. Lack of freedom of movement and detentions of people trying to cross the administrative boundary line (ABL) spoil the lives of all, regardless of ethnicity and risk increasing tensions. The EU monitoring mission (EUMM) in Georgia could play a vital role in promoting stability and acting as a deterrent to further military action, but with Russia and South Ossetia resisting its access, its effectiveness and response capability is limited.
Periodic talks in Geneva bring Russia, Georgia and representatives from South Ossetia and Abkhazia together but are bogged down over the inability to conclude an agreement on the non-use of force. Much less effort has been made to initiate incremental, practical measures that would address humanitarian needs. Positions on status are irreconcilable for the present and should be set aside. The immediate focus instead should be on securing freedom of movement for the local population and humanitarian and development organisations, which all parties are blocking to various degrees. The South Ossetians should be pressed to respect the right to return of ethnic Georgians, while Tbilisi should be more supportive of the few who either stayed in South Ossetia or have been able to go home. The Ossetians should lift their conditionality on the work of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) that has been created to deal with day-to-day issues along the ABL.
It will take a long time to rebuild any trust between the South Ossetians and Georgians, but a start is needed on steps that can make the confrontation more bearable for the people and less risky for regional stability.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To All Sides:
1. Agree urgently, without posing status or other political preconditions, on basic cooperation mechanisms and implementation modalities to ensure:
a) movement across the administrative boundary line (ABL) for local inhabitants and humanitarian and developmental organisations;
b) rights to property and return; and
c) economic freedom.
To the Government of the Russian Federation:
2. Implement fully the ceasefire agreements, which oblige Russia to reduce troop levels to those mandated before 8 August 2008, withdraw from previously unoccupied areas and allow access for international monitoring and humanitarian assistance missions to South Ossetia, particularly the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM).
3. Encourage the South Ossetian authorities to engage with the Georgian government to lower tensions and prevent incidents in the conflict zone and to participate in the joint IPRM.
4. Ensure that the right of return for Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs) is recognised; facilitate their return to South Ossetia; and monitor and prevent human rights violations in South Ossetia.
5. Put strict controls on all transfers from the Russian federal budget to South Ossetia to limit corruption.
To the Government of Georgia:
6. Define, publicise and implement a generous policy on movement across the ABL for all residents, while continuing both to refrain from arbitrary detention of South Ossetian residents and to cooperate with international bodies (Council of Europe, ICRC, EUMM) in investigating cases of missing and detained people.
7. Facilitate small-scale economic activity across the ABL; encourage the EU, UN, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international bodies to develop initiatives to loosen South Ossetian dependence on Russia; and apply the Law on Occupied Territories to support these activities in line with the new State Strategy on Engagement through Cooperation.
To the Authorities in South Ossetia:
8. Refrain from arbitrary detentions of Georgian citizens and violation of their freedom of movement; release those detained since the August 2008 war; and cooperate with international mediators in investigating cases of missing and detained people.
9. Recognise the rights of Georgian IDPs and facilitate their step-by-step return.
10. Allow the EUMM and other international officials and organisations full access to South Ossetia.
11. Discuss day-to-day issues and security with Georgia; facilitate small-scale economic and social activities across the ABL; and resume participation in the joint IPRM.
12. Put priority on eradicating high-level corruption; pursue those who embezzle reconstruction assistance; and allow greater freedom for civil society initiatives.
To the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe and other international actors:
13. Engage with Russian authorities in support of full implementation of the 2008 ceasefire agreements.
14. Continue or renew contacts with authorities and civil society groups in South Ossetia; support dialogue between Georgian and South Ossetian authorities, as well as Georgian and South Ossetian civil society groups.
15. Continue efforts to monitor the human rights situation, with a special focus on freedom of movement, arbitrary detentions and political and socio-economic rights; and advocate the implementation of international norms and principles, including the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
Tskhinvali/Tbilisi/Istanbul/Moscow/Brussels, 7 June 2010
Stichworte: Georgien, Süd-Ossetien, Russland, Krieg-2008, Archiv: #
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