Tagliavini's Report Heard at PACE Debates >>Extraseite EU-geförderter Bericht zum Augustkrieg
Georgia “triggered off the war” with heavy artillery attack on Tskhinvali in August, 2008, however, this attack was not an isolated event, but a culminating point of years of mounting tensions and all sides bear responsibility, Heidi Tagliavini, who led EU-funded fact-finding mission into causes of the war, said on April 28.
She recited key findings of the mission’s report, which was released last September, in an address to Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE). Her statement was followed by debates at the April 28 PACE session about the consequences of the August war.
In her speech before the Assembly, Tagliavini said that the report by Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) was made public immediately after the release in order “to avoid misquotations and misinterpretations.”
She said that reactions to the report in the press and in public had been mainly “positive, or factual and neutral”.
“The conflicting parties have reacted in overwhelming majority in a moderate way; although we, unfortunately, could observe some rather selective reading – I mean each party presenting those parts of the report, which were to their liking,” Tagliavini said.
This approach continued to prevail during the debates at PACE session after Tagliavini’s address with speakers from the Russian delegation focusing on Georgia’s responsibility for “triggering off the war” and the Georgian delegation members – on Russia’s responsibility for developments leading up to the war and ethnic cleansing.
“Those who were involved in the conflict were usually focusing only on their own truth; they were hardly ever sufficiently prepared to look at a truth of the others,” Tagliavini said.
She underlined that her fact-finding mission – the first of this kind in the EU history – was not leading an investigation relevant to judiciary proceeding of any sort.
“It was a strictly fact-finding mission,” Tagliavini said. “This report should not be seen as a tribunal and it was not preparing any legal action in favor or against any side or anyone.”
When she moved to laying out the mission’s key findings, Tagliavini started with, as she put it, “the answer to the question, which in the past has been asked most frequently.”
“In the mission’s view, it was Georgia, which triggered off the war, when it attacked Tskhinvali with heavy artillery on the night of 7 to 8 of August, 2008,” she said.
“None of the explanations, given by the Georgian authorities in order to provide some form of legal justification for the attack, landed valid explanation. In particular, to the best of the mission’s knowledge, there was no massive Russian military invasion underway, which had to be stopped by Georgian military forces shelling Tskhinvali.”
“It needs to be stressed, that the Georgian attack against Tskhinvali on the 7 to 8 of August, 2008 was by no means an isolated event. It was the culminating point of months and years of mounting tension, of armed incidents, and steadily deteriorating situation. All sides to the conflict bear responsibility for these evermore serious developments,” she said.
She said that although blame for triggering off the war lies on the Georgian side, Russia “too is to blame for a substantial number of violations of international law.”
“These include, even prior to the armed conflict, the mass conferral of Russian citizenship to a majority of the population living in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia. It also includes in terms of an additional violation of international law the military action by the Russian armed forces on Georgian territory far beyond the needs of a proportionate defense of Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali what come under Georgian attack. In addition, the Russian recognition of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states must be considered as being not valid in the context of international law and as violations of Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,” Tagliavini said.
She said that claims by Moscow and Tskhinvali that Georgia was carrying out “the genocide against the South Ossetian population are not substantiated.”
“On the other side, there is a serious indication that ethnic cleansing did take place in many instances against ethnic Georgians in the villages and settlements in South Ossetia, as well as other violations of international humanitarian law, which must be attributed to all sides,” she said.
“Furthermore, there are serious question marks behind the attitude of the Russian armed forces, who would not or could not stop atrocities committed by armed groups or even individuals fighting on the South Ossetian side against the civilian population in those territories, which were controlled by the Russian armed forces.”
She reiterated her call for “abstaining from assigning an overall responsibility” only to one side alone.
Tagliavini also said that the international community also had its share of responsibility.
She also said that international conflict management “was not successful” partly because of “a gradual erosion” of previously negotiated agreements and disrespect of international commitments.
She also criticized “passive and non-innovative approach to the peace processes” by OSCE and UN – organizations, which were present in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, respectively.
“When in early spring 2008 the international community eventually realized the seriousness of the situation and deployed intense high-level diplomacy with U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, EU High Representative Javier Solana and German Foreign Minister Frank Walter-Steinmeier, presenting one diplomatic initiative after the other, it was too late and not enough to prevent forthcoming crisis,” Tagliavini said.
“The series of misperception, missed opportunities and mistakes on all sides accumulated to a point that the danger of explosions and violence became real,” she added.
Debates
After Tagliavini’s address, debates were held during which head of the Georgian delegation Petre Tsiskarishvili told the Assembly that presence of Russian forces and shelling of Georgian villages in the conflict zone prior to the attack of Tskhinvali by the Georgian forces was already “the start of the war.”
“The inquiry [by Tagliavini commission] has proved that the Russian forces in consent with their Ossetian proxies have deliberately embarked on the campaign of ethnic cleansing of Georgians during and after the war. Second crucial part of this report is the passportization of citizens living on Georgia’s territory [in Abkhazia and South Ossetia],” MP Tsiskarishvili, who is leader of ruling majority in the Georgian Parliament, said.
“And last but not the least, which is very important for us, is that Russian troops – it was established by this mission – were on the territory, on the Georgian soil by August the 7th. It’s another question, whether substantial or unsubstantial forces, but the conventional Russian forces as well as paramilitary elements were ready on the Georgian territory.”
The report by the fact-finding mission, notes about the presence of “some Russian forces” in South Ossetia, other than the Russian peacekeepers, prior to 2:30pm of August 8, when Russia says it made a decision on intervention.
“To me the facts that I have just described are already start of the war,” he added.
Another speaker from the Georgian delegation, a ruling party MP Akaki Minashvili said that if it was Georgia, which started the war, “how it comes that in two hours, about ten thousand Russian soldiers were on Georgian territory – strange.”
“If we are the starters of the war, how it comes that Russia blocked eight peace proposals offered by the Georgian side and one of them was offered by [then] German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier,” MP Minashvili said.
MP Tsiskarishvili said that Russia’s policy towards Georgia was making the current situation “a classic zero-sum game”.
“Georgia either surrenders and becomes Russia’s backyard, or Russia wants to see it destroyed completely,” he said and added that through democratic reforms and international support Georgia would prevail.
Head of the Russian delegation at PACE, Konstantin Kosachev, told the Assembly that such a notion of “zero-sum game” would not help to resolve the conflict. He also said that he agreed with Heidi Tagliavini’s remarks that there were no winners from this conflict.
Initially PACE was expected to pass a resolution – the fourth since October, 2008 – about the consequences of the August war, but the process was stalled because of disagreements over the drafts.
Two preliminary drafts of the resolution were prepared, which, as one PACE members put it, “significantly differed from each other”. One was prepared by co-rapporteur on the matter Hungarian MP Mátyás Eörsi and the second one by another co-rapporteur, British MP David Wilshire. The latter was strongly criticized by Georgia for having a meeting with South Ossetian representative in so called embassy of breakaway region in Moscow. The Georgian delegations said that Wilshire’s decision agree on a meeting at that venue was putting a reason to question his objectivity in drafting of the resolution.
During the debates, David Wilshire told the Assembly that “one thing we can usefully do is try not to get hung up on terminology, on status and on which building the meeting takes place.” “We want to focus on what is achievable,” he added.
In a response to Wilshire’s remarks, Georgian lawmaker Akaki Minashvili said it was probably easy to say “let’s leave emotions back” for those people who “live in London and travel to Moscow”, but it was not easy in Georgia’s case as Russian artillery “is standing 40 kilometers away from Tbilisi, from our families and citizens.”
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Zusammenfassung – Band 2
- Was in der Presse nicht gesagt wurde -
von www.georgien-nachrichten.com
Der EU-Bericht erklärt im Kapitel 6 Teil 4 alle russischen Gewaltanwendungen als nicht gerechtfertigt, ebenso alle Gewaltanwendungen der Abchasen in Teil 5. Die Gewaltanwendungen der südossetischen Seite mit dem Beschießen georgischer Dörfer vor dem 7.8. verletzte das Gewaltverbot, welches für den Konflikt maßgeblich war. Die Gewaltanwendungen nach dem 12.8. nach dem Rückzug der georgischen Einheiten waren illegal.
In Teil 2 steht der Bericht Georgien das Eingreifen in Südossetien als gerechtfertigt zu als Selbstverteidigung in Form von „on-the-spot reaction“ und bezeichnet die georgische Offensive als nicht proportional zu dem einzigen erlaubten Ziel, zur Verteidigung gegen die andauernden südossetischen Angriffe.
Die georgische Sicht, dass russische Truppen vor dem 7./8. georgisches Territorium betreten hätten, konnte von der Kommission nicht bestätigt werden. Die Kommission schließt aber nicht aus, dass neue Beweise das Betreten Georgiens durch russische Soldaten zu diesem Zeitpunkt zeigen.
Der Bericht bestätigt auch die Anwesenheit regulärer russischer Streitkräfte in Südossetien vor dem 7.8. und die große Zahl an Provokationen zuvor auf georgischem Territorium. Die Kommission besteht im Kapitel 8 auf der Erfüllung des Sechs-Punkteabkommens, d.h. dem Rückzug der russischen Streitkräfte auf die Positionen vor dem 7.8. und stellt fest, dass dies Russland bis heute nicht erfüllt hat. Die Kommission nennt die Anerkennung Südossetiens und Abchasiens durch Russland einen "Anschlag auf die internationalen Anstrengungen zur Konfliktlösung".
EU-geförderter Bericht zum Augustkrieg 2008 – 30.09.2009 - Original-Textpassagen aus dem Bericht
Chapter 3 - Related Legal Issues
3.1. The Legal Status of
III. Comment –Seite 136
Neither should Abkhazia be recognised. Although it shows the characteristics of statehood, the process of state-building as such is not legitimate, as Abkhazia never had a right to secession. Furthermore, Abkhazia does not meet basic requirements regarding human and minority rights, especially because it does not guarantee a right of safe return to IDPs/refugees.
Chapter 6 - Use of Force
Part 2: Use of force by
II. Legal qualification of the Georgian offensive - Seite 239:
… Consequently, a government is generally not prevented from using armed force in internal conflicts, e.g. against insurgents starting a civil war or against territorial entities fighting violently for
secession. …
Seite 244 – 246:
2. Legal assessment: “Armed attack” by South Ossetia on
The underlying question is whether the military operations of the South Ossetian militia preceding the Georgian air and ground offensive constituted an “armed attack” on
a) Attacks on Georgian villages by South Ossetian forces as “armed attack” on
… The attacks on Georgian villages (Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikozi, Avnevi, Nuli, Ergneti,
Eredvi and Zemo Prisi) by South Ossetian forces can be qualified as equivalent to an “attack by the armed forces of a State on the territory of another State” resembling the situations described in Art. 3(a) of UN Resolution 3314. In this context, the delineation of the territories of South Ossetia and
To the extent that heavy artillery was used, the attacks against Georgian villages by South
b) South Ossetian attacks on the Georgian peacekeepers and police as an “armed
attack”
The South Ossetian attacks on the villages were primarily directed against Georgian peacekeepers and against Georgian police. This constitutes an attack by the armed forces of
South Ossetia on the land forces of
3314.61
c) Military action by
… There may be military operations which amount to a use of force but nevertheless do not yet
constitute an armed attack in the sense of Art. 51 of the UN Charter. To be deemed an armed
attack, an operation must have a minimum “scale and effects”. …
It can therefore be assumed that the South Ossetian attacks on Georgian villages as well as on Georgian peacekeepers and police had a minimum scale and effects, but further conditions must be met in order to allow for the Georgian claim of self-defence, which will discussed next. …
3. Burden of proof for the armed attack
The problem remains that it cannot be clearly determined which side began the fighting prior
to the Georgian air and ground offensive. The situation was highly explosive, and both sides
seem to have prepared for use of force and were ready to use force. It is impossible to decide
who fired the first shot in the incidents noted above. …
When Georgia argues that its air and ground offensive on 7 August 2008 is justified by self-defence because of a cumulative armed attack by South-Ossetia, the burden of proof falls on Georgia.
IV. Conclusions: no self-defence by
To the extent that the attacks on Georgian villages, police and peacekeepers were conducted by South Ossetian militia, self-defence in the form of on-the-spot reactions by Georgian troops was necessary and proportionate and thus justified under international law.
On the other hand, the offensive that started on 7 August, even if it were deemed necessary, was not proportionate to the only permissible aim, the defence against the on-going attacks from
Chapter 6 - Use of Force
Part 3: Use of force by South Ossetia against
I. Facts
As explained above, the South Ossetian militia were involved in shooting at Georgian villages, police and peacekeepers before the outbreak of the armed conflict. After the air and ground offensive by the Georgian army the South Ossetian militia probably tried to defend their positions.
II. Legal qualification: use of force, but partly justified as self-defence
To the extent that South Ossetian militia initiated the shooting on Georgian villages, police and peacekeepers before the outbreak of the armed conflict,
South Ossetian use of force could have been justified as self-defence only in the event of an armed attack by
Part 4: Use of force by
I. Facts
training, arming, equipping, financing and supporting them.
II. Legal qualification of the Russian involvement in the conflict
Under Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter and the parallel customary law, the military operations of the Russian army as described in Chapter 5 “Military Events of 2008”130 in the territory of Georgia (including South Ossetia and Abkhazia and elsewhere in Georgia) in August 2008 constituted a violation of the fundamental international legal prohibition of the use of force. The main legal issue is whether these activities could be justified as legally recognized exceptions.
III. No justification of the use of force as self-defence
... The means employed by
objective, which was to eliminate the threat for Russian peacekeepers. In any case, much of
the destruction (see Chapter 5 “Military Events in 2008”) after the conclusion of the ceasefire
agreement is not justifiable by any means. According to international law, the Russian
military action taken as a whole was therefore neither necessary nor proportionate to protect
Russian peacekeepers in
IV. No justification of Russian use of force as fulfilment of the peacekeeping mission
… Conclusion:
of its peacekeeping mission.
V. No justification of the use of force by invitation of the South Ossetian authorities
… To conclude, both under the doctrine of asymmetry and under the new doctrine of negative equality concerning intervention in a civil war, the South Ossetian authorities could not validly invite
VI. No justification of the use of force by collective self-defence
… Russian military activities against the Georgian military forces were not justified as collective self-defence under international law.
VII. No justification of the use of force as “humanitarian intervention”
To conclude, the Russian use of force cannot be justified as a humanitarian intervention.
VIII. No justification of the use of force as action to rescue and protect nationals abroad
In conclusion, the Russian intervention in
Part 5: Use of force in Abkhazia
II. Legal qualification of the Abkhaz and Russian offensive: violation of the prohibition of the use of force and armed attack on
III. Legal qualification of the Georgian operation: self-defence
The military operation in the upper
IV. No justification of the Abkhaz and Russian use of force against
... All these arguments can constitute a legally permissible justification only to the extent that
they point to an armed attack by
by
party is not allowed for the reasons explained above. ...
2. No previous “armed attack” by
a) No Georgian military operation in the
b) No preceding terrorist attacks sponsored by Georgiab) No preceding terrorist attacks sponsored by
c) No imminent armed attack on Abkhazia as a whole by
4. Conclusion
The use of force by Abkhazia was not justified under international law and was thus illegal.
The same applies to the Russian support for Abkhaz use of force.
Chapter 8 - Back to Diplomacy
On 12 August, the Russian Government reported to the European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, that “the aim of
• to refrain from the use of force;
• to end hostilities definitively;
• to provide free access for humanitarian aid;
• Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;
• Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures;
• opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and
As long as international mechanisms were not put into place, Russian peacekeepers patrolled in a large so-called buffer zone outside
A diplomatic event called the six- point peace plan into even greater question. On 25 August,
On 8 September, President Sarkozy and President Medvedev signed a follow-on ceasefire agreement setting out the provisions of the six point plan in detail. It provided for measures on the withdrawal of armed forces and for international monitoring mechanisms. It also referred to the continuation of the activities of the international observers of UNOMIG and OSCE Mission to
Russian troops withdrew from Poti and Senaki on 13 September and pulled back by 9 October from so-called buffer zones in accordance with the follow-on ceasefire plan. However, only one day after this plan was agreed upon, the Russian Defence Minister asserted that several thousand Russian troops would remain in Abkhazia and
Moreover the Kremlin’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and
The international discussions on
Stichworte: Georgien, Abchasien, Süd-Ossetien, Russland, Krieg-2008, Sprache: deutsch, englisch, Archiv: #
